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Executive Summary 
Defined benefit retirement plans for state employees have come under fire, both financially 
and politically, following recent market volatility and subsequent losses in pension investments. 
Asset losses matched with liabilities that are set years in advance translate to pressures on state 
policymakers and plan administrators to either find ways to improve the finances of these pension 
systems or transition to defined contribution plans that put the financial risk on individual 
employees rather than the state government. Because most states are legally and contractually 
obligated to pay retiree benefits regardless of the pension system’s financial condition — even to 
the point of paying benefits out of their general funds — this looming threat could be borne not just 
by public service retirees, but by those who receive the benefits of public schools, social services, 
and other important public programs. 
Defined benefit plans gain funding from three sources: employee contributions, employer 
(state government) contributions, and earnings on investments. While the first is largely 
unchangeable for current workers, the latter two come under constant scrutiny. This research 
seeks to investigate the role these two funding sources have played in various state pension plans’ 
financial conditions. 
Using data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators, and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College for Fiscal Years 2001-
2008, this report evaluated three aspects of plan funding: 1) employer contributions relative to 
actuarial recommendations, 2) investment returns, and 3) asset allocation decisions. This was done 
by both simple time-trend analysis and regression analysis. 
This research suggests that while there is little connection between broad asset class 
allocation and pension plan investment returns, and little connection between investment returns 
and the overall financial condition of individual pension systems, two factors may play a role in 
pension plan finances. 
First, there is a small but distinct difference in asset allocation decisions between states that 
had financially sound pension systems for state retirees at the end of Fiscal Year 2008, and those 
that did not. Better-funded plans tended to place a larger share of their investments in cash and 
stocks, and a smaller amount in bonds and alternative investments. Second, states that regularly 
contributed the full amount recommended by plan actuaries were more likely to have financially 
sound pension systems.  
Although these results are not conclusive, they suggest that further research in this area 
may prove instructive to policymakers. 
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Introduction 
A 2010 report by the Pew Center on the State revealed that the aggregate shortfall in state 
employee pension funds was $1 trillion.1 That represents a gap between state pension systems’ 
assets of $2.25 trillion and the promised benefits to state workers and retirees of $3.35 trillion. The 
bill for this shortfall will not come due immediately, but will have long-term implications. 
There are several ramifications of such a large shortfall. Due to state laws and other factors, 
states are largely unable to simply ignore their obligations. If the money to pay retirees their future 
benefits cannot be found in the pension funds themselves, states will be forced to pay for those 
benefits out of their general appropriations. This, in turn, means one of two things: either tax 
increases, which no public official prefers, or cuts in other areas of state government. Pension 
obligations for public employees represent one of the three fastest-growing cost drivers of state 
government, along with Medicaid and corrections.2 Unless states can reduce these unfunded 
liabilities, it seems likely that one or all of these other areas of state government will suffer. 
At this time, there is also talk at the federal level of allowing states to declare bankruptcy, 
which could in turn allow them to reduce or shed entirely their pension obligations. This, too, 
would have negative consequences for the states. As of 2008, more than 7.7 million state and local 
government retirees in the United States were collecting pension benefits, and 19 million more 
workers were on a path to someday receive benefits themselves.3 In all, this accounts for nearly 1 in 
11 Americans’ retirement security. If these retirees were to suddenly lose all or part of their 
pension benefits, the loss to the states’ local economies would be significant. State and local public 
pensions contribute more than $350 billion in economic activity, according to the National Institute 
on Retirement Security.4 Many of these retirees would in turn attempt to return to the workforce in 
some capacity, exacerbating an already high unemployment rate. 
Any state that was to declare bankruptcy would also find its bonding costs increase 
substantially, further putting the squeeze on education, public safety, and social programs. While 49 
of the 50 states have balanced budget requirements, all use bonding in some form to initiate capital 
projects. While unfunded pension liabilities have already helped cause some states’ bond ratings to 
be lowered, declaring bankruptcy to eliminate those liabilities would severely drive up the cost of 
capital construction — a cost that would in turn be borne by taxpayers and the general public. 
                                                          
1
 Pew Center on the States. “The trillion dollar gap: Underfunded state retirement systems and the roads to 
reform.” February 2010. http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates.org/The_Trillion_Dollar_Gap_final.pdf 
2
 Fehr, Stephen C. “Recession could reshape state governments in lasting ways.” Stateline. February 11, 2010. 
3
 2008 U.S. Census Bureau State & Local Public Retirement Systems Survey. 
4
 Boive, Ilana and Beth Almeida. “Pensionomics: Measuring the Economic Impact of State and Local Pension Plans.” 
February 2009. http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Pensionomics%20Report.pdf 
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How Defined Benefit Plans Operate 
Although there are a variety of combinations, there are two basic types of retirement plans 
for public employees. Defined contribution plans allow employees to choose the amount of their 
contribution as well as the way it is invested. When they retire, the entire amount is theirs to keep.  
The risk and the reward are entirely up to the employee. The employer has relative cost 
certainty in this scenario, because they contribute a fixed amount to each employee’s individual 
account. This can take the form of a fixed percentage of the employee’s salary or a match of the 
employee’s own contributions up to a set threshold. Because of the financial certainty involved and 
the lack of long-term risk, more private and public sector employers are shifting their pension plans 
to this type. 
Defined benefit plans set employee contributions at a fixed level, along with the employer 
contribution. The major difference between the two types of plans is that all participants’ 
contributions are merged into a single investment pool, with retirees’ pension benefits based on a 
set formula rather than the performance of their individual investments. The formula is generally 
set far in advance, often when the employee is first hired. Investment decisions are made by the 
pension plan administrators, with the employer bearing the risk if investment returns are not 
enough to cover promised benefits. 
In some states, a hybrid of the two types is used, with employees guaranteed a minimum 
retirement benefit with the ability to invest on their own for additional benefits. 
Although each defined benefit plan varies in its exact details, the funding sources are the 
same. Employees pay in a set amount of their salaries, and employers contribute a set amount of 
their payrolls. These payments are in turn invested by the fund administrator with the dual 
purposes of growing assets over time and paying out current benefits to retirees. 
As a rule, states cannot simply change the terms of their defined benefits plans for retirees 
or current employees. State constitutions, contract law, and legal precedents require pension 
benefits to be paid regardless of the total amount in the pension fund. Employees’ pension benefits 
also cannot be reduced below the level provided on the first day of employment in most states, 
although they can be increased. 
Twenty states made changes to their employee pension plans in 2010, ranging from 
increased eligibility requirements for employees to changes in the benefit calculations to increased 
required employee contributions.5 As previously stated, however, only new hires will be affected by 
                                                          
5
 Snell, Ron. National Conference of State Legislatures. “State Retirement Legislation in 2010: Summary Review.”  
http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=GzW%2bswQIcbc%3d&tabid=13399 
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these changes, meaning the reduced benefits will not be drawn upon for at least a generation. These 
changes will result in long-term financial health, but have little immediate impact. 
Instead, state governments have two main ways to positively alter their pension plans’ 
financial conditions for the near future. With one factor in the three-part funding scheme 
unalterable, they must change at least one of the other two revenue streams — employer 
contributions and investment earnings. 
This research focuses primarily on those two factors — not how they might be used to 
improve pension plans’ financial condition, but whether they contributed to the current unfunded 
liability. 
State governments, unlike employees, have on occasion taken the opportunity to reduce the 
amounts they contribute to their pension funds. During good economic times, investment returns 
may exceed set expectations, allowing the government to reduce its contribution while remaining 
above the funding ratio considered financially sound. This may be considered politically prudent 
when other construction projects or social services may be short-term priorities.  
In economic downturns, these same infrastructure improvements and social services may 
be seen as more urgent, with the long-term financial picture of the pension system a lower priority. 
Fund administrators’ investment decisions can also be influenced by market conditions. 
When the market is doing well, “crowd behavior” dictates that investors move toward popular 
choices. These included technology stocks in the late 1990s and real estate and financial derivatives 
in the last decade. When the bubble bursts in these investments and returns consequently drop, 
decisions are made with a focus on above-average returns and the accompanying above-average 
risks. 
 
Evaluating Retirement Plans 
Although each of the plans included in this report share a common setup, the specifics of 
each plan are highly varied. Each plan has different requirements for how long employees must 
work to ensure maximum guaranteed benefits at retirement as well as how much of their salary 
each employee must contribute. Likewise, each plan uses a different formula to calculate an 
employee’s retirement benefits. While some systems may simply use an employee’s final salary, 
others use an average of the employee’s highest three years — or five years, ten years, and such. 
Each also has its own “retirement factor” — a specific percent of salary, set by law or policy, used in 
calculations for benefits.  
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Due to changes in retirement plans over time, each pension system may also have within it a 
variety of formulas used to calculate retirement benefits, based on when an employee first entered 
government service. It is also common for different subsets of employees to have their retirement 
benefits calculated using different formulas, different restrictions imposed on them in terms of 
required service for full pensions, and different required employee contributions. For example, it is 
common in many states that police officers, firefighters, and other hazardous-duty employees to 
pay more into their plans in exchange for fewer years required for full retirement benefits. 
Additionally, each system uses different criteria in actuarially assessing its long-term 
finances. On the assets side of the ledger, each system has its own expected rate of return, which it 
uses to make investment decisions. (In turn, policymakers use these expectations to determine 
employee benefits going forward.)  
In terms of liabilities, each system also sets its own expected rate of inflation. These 
expectations varied from 2.5% annual inflation to 5%, and over the 30-year horizon used to 
calculate pension liabilities, those small differences can make a substantial difference in the assets-
to-liabilities ratio used to measure a pension plan’s financial condition. 
The assets-to-liabilities to ratio — “funding ratio” for short — is the traditional measure of a 
pension plan’s financial condition. To calculate this, a plan actuary calculates the amount of benefits 
that are expected to be paid out over the long term. Thirty years is the industry standard for this 
calculation. Those long-term liabilities are then discounted by the expected rate of inflation to 
arrive at the plan’s “current” liabilities. The plan’s current assets are then compared to the current 
value of the liabilities to arrive at the plan’s funding ratio.  
Guidelines issued by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, which sets financial 
reporting standards for state and local governments, currently assume that an 80% funding ratio is 
acceptable or “healthy” when determining the financial condition of a pension plan — that is, the 
plan currently has 80% of the funds necessary to pay expected benefits over the plan’s set long-
term horizon. This allows plan administrators and government a period of time to either boost 
investment returns or to increase employer contributions. 
 
Literature Review 
A number of studies and research projects have been conducted on the issue of public 
pension sustainability, especially in the last decade due to market volatility. These studies have 
been both academic and practice-driven. They have also looked at the issue from a variety of 
viewpoints, most commonly what characteristics define higher-funded (“better”) pension plans 
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from lesser-funded plans and what aspects of their funding and financial mechanisms have 
contributed to those conditions. 
One major topic of contention is whether defined-benefit plans like most state pension 
plans are sustainable regardless of typical characteristics.6 Given certain commonly-assumed 
parameters, including an 8% expected rate of return, “states in aggregate will run out of funds in 
2025.” States are not funded in aggregate, however — each state pension plan is guaranteed to 
some degree by its individual state government. Using the same assumption of an 8% annual 
return, 28 states will be forced to pay for employee pension plans out of the general receipts by 
2025 — leaving the minority in relatively good financial shape.7 If projected returns are reduced 
only slightly, from 8% to 6% annual return, the number of state pension plans unable to meet their 
immediate pension obligations in 2025 rises to 38.8 
One problem in determining the future of state pension plans — beyond the impossibility of 
predicting the markets — is calculating liabilities. Actuaries tend to use a flat 8% discount rate 
when figuring future obligations, regardless of time horizon or potential future conditions.9 Few 
states actually achieve that return on investment over the long term, undervaluing their liabilities.10 
As a result, even states that maintain their full employer contribution at actuarially recommended 
rates could at some point be underfunded. 
Among the variables studied to explain the difference in states’ unfunded liabilities’ have 
been per capita income, managerial influence, political influence, concentration of state employees, 
and employer contributions.11 Of the three factors deemed to be significant influences on unfunded 
pension liabilities, two were outside the scope of this research (state governments’ fiscal constraint 
and financial management practices) because they focus on state financial characteristics as a 
whole. The third factor, however, is related indirectly to this project: the required employer 
contribution. The research suggests that states that require larger employer (that is, state 
government) contributions tend to have larger unfunded liabilities. This is likely related not to the 
requirements themselves, but in the state’s decisions to not adhere to those requirements. 
                                                          
6
 Rauh, Joshua. “Are State Public Pensions Sustainable?”. December 31, 2009. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
10 Munnell, Alicia H., Richard W. Kopcke, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Laura Quinby. “Valuing Liabilities in State and 
Local Plans.” Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. June 2010. 
11 Coggburn, Jerrell D. and Richard C. Kearney. “Trouble Keeping Promises? An Analysis of Underfunding in State 
Retiree Benefits. Public Administration Review. Vol. 70, Issue 1. January/February 2010. 
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That likelihood of continuing full employer contributions — and perhaps even exceeding 
them in many cases to hedge the possibility of continued market underperformance — is affected 
by four factors that have affected employer contributions in the past.12 Two of these factors are 
outside the scope of this research — the number of employees or retired employees on the pension 
systems’ governing boards, and whether employees are eligible for Social Security. The other two 
are related to this project —funding discipline and actuarially recommended employer 
contributions (ARC) as a percentage of payroll. This second factor is related to Coggburn’s variable 
of required contribution.  
In both Coggburn and the just cited Munnell research, an unsurprising fact emerged: as the 
ARC grew for states, their likelihood of actually contributing 100% of that amount fell. This 
suggests that if liabilities were calculated differently, enlarging the ARC for each state, even more 
would fall short of 100% ARC funding in any given year. 
The other factor that will be studied in my research is the effect of investment decisions by 
the administrators of the pension plans. These can be constrained by statute or regulation, but 
regardless, fund administrators are given broad leeway both in terms of categories of investments 
and specific investments within those categories. The biggest factor in funding ratio changes 
between 1988 and 2005 was the investment return of the pension plan13, but this does not account 
for any difference in individual investment decisions. 
This report supplemented other research, however, in finding that plans that did not 
receive their full ARC funding in multiple years were more likely to have lower funding ratios. 
Rather than the more dire predictions of other reports, however, the GAO suggested that given the 
broad time horizon for public investment pools, state governments could slowly increase their 
contributions and reduce benefits in order to restore the financial soundness of their pension plans, 
just as they reached instability over a period of time rather than overnight. 
A later GAO report14 focused on the change in investment practices for state and local 
government pension plans. As these pans take on additional risk to boost returns and overcome 
their funding shortfalls, investment strategies alone will not be enough to restore complete fiscal 
                                                          
12 Munnell, Alicia H., Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Laura Quinby. “Public Pension Funding in Practice.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research. October 2010. 
13 United States Government Accountability Office. “State and Local Government Retiree Benefits.” Report to the 
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate. January 2008. 
14 United States Government Accountability Office. “State and Local Government Pension Plans.” Report to the 
Ranking Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate. August 2010. 
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soundness to most plans. In fact, the opposite is just as likely — that the riskier investments will 
suffer losses and exacerbate the unfunded liabilities. 
On the other hand, some of these riskier investments, ranging from hedge funds to real 
estate and commodities, can be seen as diversifying pension plan portfolios and helping to smooth 
returns, enhancing predictability. 
None of the reports cited here has studied whether investment category choices have 
significantly affected pension plan funding ratios, leaving open an avenue for future research — 
namely, whether there may be some best practices or most advisable asset allocation that is best at 
smoothing out returns and offering a more predictable revenue stream. 
 
Data Collection 
Each year, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts its State & Local Public Retirement Systems 
Survey, collecting information on the membership, assets, revenues, and expenditures of more than 
1,000 public defined benefit pension plans. Notably absent in this dataset is each plan’s actuarial 
liabilities as well as the actuarially recommended employer contribution. 
 Both the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College also conduct their own studies and data collection in this 
field. NASRA, in association with the National Council on Teacher Retirement, have conducted the 
Public Fund Survey each year beginning in 2001. CRR also maintains a separate database of state 
and local retirement system data dating back to 2001. These three databases were compared to 
ensure data integrity and to eliminate from the research any pension systems for which there was 
conflicting or insufficient data. 
Beginning with a universe of 50 retirement systems for general state employees, plans were 
eliminated from the dataset for two reasons. First, some states during the considered time frame 
moved to a 401(k)-style defined contribution pension plan, which altered their assets-to-liabilities 
ratio outside the scope of this research. Alternatively, one state changed its plan from one in which 
all contributions came from the government to one in which employees also contributed, skewing 
later asset data. 
 Second, for some states the Census Bureau collates data for multiple retirement plans into a 
single report so that the numbers for Census data and NASRA/CRR do not match. This means that 
the funding ratio for those states could not be accurately calculated. Eliminating these states from 
the group resulted in a final dataset of 33 state pension plans. 
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Data Analysis 
 The 33 plans evaluated were separated into three categories based on their funding ratios 
at the end of Fiscal Year 2008. (Each plan’s data was used according to the plan’s own fiscal year. Of 
the 33 plans, 26 ended their fiscal years on June 30, one ended on August 31, one ended on 
September 30, and the remaining five ended on December 31.) 
“Solidly funded” state employee pension plans had a funding ratio above 95%, meaning that 
a single year of significantly above-average investment performance or employer contributions 
could return them to 100% funding or better.  
“Adequately funded” plans’ funding ratios were between 80% and 95%. All these plans 
qualified as “healthy” under GASB standards, but must show some improvement over time in order 
to meet all their long-term obligations. 
All states with funding ratios below 80% 
were grouped as “inadequately funded.” 
These plans did not, as of the end of FY 
2008, meet GASB standards for funding 
and could have serious trouble meeting 
their long-term obligations if substantial 
steps are not taken to improve funding levels. 
There were 12 plans classified as solidly funded, 11 plans classified as adequately funded, 
and 10 plans classified as inadequately funded. 
 The state employee pension plans within each category were then compared to discover 
similarities in terms of employer contribution and asset allocation trends, and each category was in 
turn compared to the summary data from the other categories. 
 
Employer Contributions 
For each fiscal year, plan administrators and their actuaries calculate the Actuarially 
Recommended Contribution, or ARC. This is the amount necessary to maintain the plan’s ability to 
pay benefits given such parameters as expected inflation and the expected rate of return on 
invested funds. As stated in its name, this is merely a recommendation by plan administrators; state 
policymakers can choose to fund the plan at a higher or lower amount for reason stated previously. 
The actual employer contribution, as decided by state policymakers, is called the ARC ratio when 
stated as a percentage of the ARC. 
Table 1. Description of Report's Tiered System 
Category 
Solidly 
Funded 
Adequately 
Funded 
Inadequately 
Funded 
Funding 
ratio 
>95% 80-95% <80% 
No. of States 12 11 10 
11 
 
Legislators in states with solidly funded plans, on average, contributed at or near 100% of 
ARC each year during this study period. On average, legislators in states with adequately funded 
plans contributed 91% of the ARC in any given year. The two categories were fairly similar in 
contributions the last six years, with solidly funded plans contributing significantly more than the 
ARC in FY 2001 and 2002, potentially accounting for the overall difference in the two groups. 
Inadequately funded plans, meanwhile, never met the full ARC in any year on a mean basis.  
 
Figure 1.  
  
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the National Association of State                                           
Retirement Administrators and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
 
Given the small sample size for each category, one state’s outsize contribution could skew 
these results. Indeed, in FY 2001 Wyoming contributed 483 percent of its ARC, and in FY 2002 
Pennsylvania paid in 222%. Both were in the “solidly funded” category. At the other end, among 
inadequately funded plans, New Jersey contributed only 13% of the ARC in FY 2001 and 10% in FY 
2002. 
However, the median figures for each category reflect a similar trend. The median figure for 
both solidly funded and adequately funded plans was a full 100% ARC payment. The median 
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inadequately funded state, meanwhile, made its full ARC contribution in the first two years, then 
continued to drop thereafter. On this basis, the average annual ARC payment was 84%. 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the National Association of State                                           
Retirement Administrators and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
 
Looking at individual states within each category (See Appendix B), the only states within 
the solidly funded category that fell below 100% ARC funding in any year were Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, and Wyoming, which all had contribution spikes earlier in the time frame that offset 
those decreases. 
Among adequately funded plans, only Virginia fell significantly below full ARC funding in 
any given year — 68% in FY 2003. Each state largely grouped around the 90-100% percent range, 
however. 
Given the wider range of final funding ratios among inadequately funded plans, the variety 
of ARC contributions is unsurprising. Among these 10 states, only South Carolina and Alabama met 
their full ARC contribution in every year. 
Taken together, this data suggests that there is a strong correlation between the degree to 
which employer contributions follow actuarial recommendations and their funding ratios as of the 
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end of FY 2008. The exceptions, notably South Carolina and Alabama, however, merit further 
investigation. 
 
Investment Results 
The other area that can be changed in the short-term is a pension system’s asset allocation 
— that is, the amount invested in various categories, including stocks, bonds, and other areas.  
The Center for Retirement Research dataset contained information on annual investment 
returns for each system, as self-reported by the plans themselves, as a percentage increase on the 
previous year’s funds minus paid benefits and expenses. For the purposes of this study, the data 
was compiled in two ways. First, each year’s annual investment returns were added together and 
then divided by eight to arrive at an average annual return for the period. 
For example, Kentucky’s state employee pension plan saw investment returns over the 
eight-year study period of -5.4%, -4.3%, 4.3%, 13.6%, 9.3%, 9.7%, 15.3%, and -4.2%. The mean for 
these eight annual figures was 4.78%. 
Second, the returns were calculated cumulatively, since heavy losses early in the study 
period, when the technology bubble burst, could affect the amount gained in later investments. 
Similarly, large gains and losses, when compared to smaller variance, can have the same average, 
the investment proceeds can differ greatly. Although this does not account for the portions of the 
fund paid out to retirees over the time frame, it can be a suitable proxy for longer-term investment 
performance. The previously cited numbers for Kentucky resulted in a total return for the period of 
42.01%. 
In comparing the three tiers against each other, there is very little difference in any single 
fiscal year. The largest variance among the three categories was in 2003, when solidly funded states 
on average outperformed adequately funded states by 4.28 percentage points, and in 2008, when 
they underperformed by 5.76 percentage points. Looking at the rank order of states by both 
average annual return and by cumulative return shows no demonstrable order or pattern to the 
results. 
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Figure 3.  
 
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the National Association of State  Retirement Administrators and the 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
 
 
Notably, of the two states that were in the inadequately funded group despite maintaining 
high ARC ratios throughout the study period, South Carolina had relatively positive investment 
results, while Alabama’s were among the bottom. (See Appendix C.) Also notable was that the state 
with the worst investment performance by both methods of calculation, Wyoming, was a solidly 
funded state. In fact, of the three states with the worst investment performances in the final year — 
Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and Ohio — all three finished with relatively healthy pension systems. 
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Asset Allocation 
The Census Bureau dataset includes information on asset allocation among four broad 
categories during this time frame: stocks, bonds, cash and other highly liquid investments, and all 
alternative investments. The last category can include real estate, financial derivatives, and any 
other investment programs. 
Three regression models were run using 
this dataset, using three separate investment 
return bases. The first two were the cumulative 
return over the eight-year study period for each 
of the 33 plans (33 total observations) and the 
mean annual return for each plan (33 
observations). For each of these, the mean asset 
allocation to each of the four asset classes was 
used to gauge correlation. 
The third model used each state’s annual 
returns — 33 states and eight years. Data on 
Ohio’s 2001 investment returns were 
unavailable, leaving a total of 263 observations. 
This last dataset used the reported asset 
allocation for each plan in each year, since the 
exact percentage changed over the course of the 
study period. 
For each regression model, a dummy 
variable was used for the funding category to test 
whether states that were in the two lower-
funded categories experienced investment 
returns that were lower or higher at a 
statistically significant level. 
The results of these regression models suggests that only one asset class, stocks, is 
statistically significant in any way. In two of the three regression models (annual returns and 
average returns), stocks showed a slightly negative correlation with investment results at the 95% 
confidence interval. Even in these two scenarios, the statistical significance did not translate to true 
Table 2. Regression Analysis Models 
 
   Annual Returns 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Cash 0.017 0.499 
Stocks* -0.033 0.030 
Bonds 0.025 0.326 
Adequately Funded Category -0.047 0.942 
Inadequately Funded Category -0.501 0.448 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.833 
  No. of Observations: 263 
  * - Significant at the 95% level 
  
   Average Returns 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Cash 0.005 0.814 
Stocks* -0.033 0.030 
Bonds -0.004 0.875 
Adequately Funded Category -0.007 0.987 
Inadequately Funded Category -0.414 0.375 
Adjusted R-Squared: .082 
  No. of Observations: 33 
  * - Significant at the 95% level 
  
   Cumulative Returns 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Cash 0.153 0.581 
Stocks -0.381 0.054 
Bonds -0.039 0.912 
Adequately Funded Category 2.213 0.696 
Inadequately Funded Category -1.724 0.776 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.023 
  No. of Observations: 33 
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financial significance. In both models, it required an increase of 30% of the total portfolio allocated 
to stocks to result in a 1% decrease in investment performance. 
In addition, of the three regression models, only the one that studied annual returns had a 
high Adjusted R-Squared value, suggesting it might be useful to use that model as a predictor of 
future results. 
In short, this analysis suggests that broad asset classes themselves were not significant 
determinants of investment performance. This does not, however, eliminate the possibility that 
individual choices within those classes may have played a role. 
Following the regression analysis, a second, simpler form of analysis was conducted. The 
next set of graphs once again separates the states into the three categories, with each group’s mean 
asset allocation by year. The resulting graphs show that on average, inadequately funded plans 
devoted less of their portfolio to cash and stocks throughout the cycle, regardless of market 
conditions, while generally allocating more to bonds and to alternative investments. Alternative 
investments, as stated earlier, captures a widely varied universe of assets, ranging from real estate 
to financial derivatives to private equity. Many of the assets in this category, however, saw a 
growing bubble along with the stock market climb during the middle of the decade and a notable 
bursting of said bubble in late 2007 and throughout 2008. 
 
Figure 4. 
 
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau State & Local                                   
Government Employee Retirement Systems Survey 
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Figure 5. 
 
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau State & Local                                   
Government Employee Retirement Systems Survey 
 
 
Figure 6. 
 
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau State & Local                                   
Government Employee Retirement Systems Survey 
  
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
A
ve
ra
ge
 %
 A
llo
ca
te
d
 t
o
 S
to
ck
s
Fiscal Year
Annual Allocation to Stocks                         
by Category, 2001-2008
Solidly Funded Plans
Adequately Funded Plans
Inadequately Funded Plans
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
A
ve
ra
ge
 %
 A
llo
ca
te
d
 t
o
 B
o
n
d
s
Fiscal Year
Annual Allocation to Bonds                         
by Category, 2001-2008
Adequately Funded Plans
Inadequately Funded Plans
Solidly Funded Plans
18 
 
Figure 7. 
 
Source: Author Construction from Data Supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau State & Local                                   
Government Employee Retirement Systems Survey 
 
 
Conclusions 
Individual state investment performance was not a significant determinant of end-of-FY 
2008 financial condition under the parameters of this research. There was a wide variation within 
each tier in terms of investment returns, and state pension plans with high returns — and 
conversely low returns — were just as likely to remain in financial peril as of FY 2008 as they were 
to be fully funded. 
A somewhat stronger indicator of financial strength was asset allocation, with a noticeable 
pattern emerging between inadequately funded plans on the one hand and solidly funded and 
adequately funded states on the other. State financial pension plans that remained in sound 
financial shape tended to allocate a larger share of their portfolio to cash and stocks and a lower 
share to bonds and alternative asset classes than state pension plans that remain in financial 
condition. Taken as individual states and not as groups, however, regression analysis suggests little 
if any relationship between asset allocation and investment performance. 
The strongest correlation was between pension plan strength and employer contributions. 
State governments that regularly contributed 100% of the amount recommended by actuaries were 
much more likely to end FY 2008 in sound financial condition that states that regularly paid in less 
than was recommended. 
These results suggest that, while states continue to investigate the possibilities of defined 
contribution schemes or hybrid models, those that choose to maintain defined benefit plans in the 
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future should begin their programs to restore financial health by increasing their employer 
contributions. Given that many have shortchanged their earlier contributions, they may choose to 
follow the models of Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and Massachusetts, which offset smaller 
contributions in some years with contributions above 100% in other years. 
 
Caveats and Suggestions for Further Research 
The report serves to point future research in a helpful direction. The outlier of South 
Carolina, which regularly contributed full funding and realized some of the most impressive 
investment returns, suggests there may be other factors in play here.  
Specifically, this report considers each state’s investment returns as opposed to other 
states’ returns, not against the state’s own expectations for investment returns. States with outsized 
performance expectations may do well in the market relative to other states but still fall behind in 
terms of its own financial condition because of benefits promised to retirees and current workers 
based on that expected rate of return. 
Second, due to data limitations and author time constraints, this report considers a 
consolidated eight-year time frame in which the market experienced two bubbles. A longer time 
frame dating back to the mid-1990s may give more evidence of long-term problems in those states 
whose pension plans face peril.  
Third, the small sample size of 33 states may not allow for the conclusions to be generalized 
to other systems, including pension systems specialized for teachers, local workers, or hazardous-
duty-only workers. 
 
Final Summary 
As state-level policymakers from elected lawmakers to appointed plan administrators look 
to improve the funding level of their state employee pension plans — or maintain that funding level 
in states that are already at that level — the results of this research suggest that consistent 
employer contributions of 100% of the actuarial recommended level is the most likely path for a 
financially sound pension plan. For those plans that are not currently in sound condition, employer 
contributions of greater than 100%, when fiscally possible, are more likely to help restore financial 
soundness than any sort of asset allocation change. 
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Appendix A. State Pension Plans and Summary Data  
State Pension 
System 
2008 
Funding 
Ratio Category 
Avg.          
ARC 
Ratio, 
2001-
2008 
Avg.  
Portfolio 
Allocation 
to Cash  
Avg.  
Portfolio 
Allocation 
to Stocks 
Avg.  
Portfolio 
Allocation 
to Bonds 
Avg.  
Portfolio 
Allocation 
to Other 
Holdings 
South Dakota 105.78% Solid 100.0% 23.2% 37.1% 10.5% 29.2% 
Florida 105.05% Solid 101.6% 13.5% 40.8% 19.1% 26.6% 
Pennsylvania 103.67% Solid 89.0% 8.8% 13.9% 10.5% 66.8% 
Wisconsin 101.76% Solid 99.9% 9.2% 44.8% 10.3% 35.7% 
New Mexico 99.61% Solid 100.0% 21.1% 40.4% 16.4% 22.2% 
Ohio 99.61% Solid 100.0% 9.1% 45.1% 17.1% 28.7% 
Wyoming 97.90% Solid 143.3% 21.8% 56.4% 16.0% 5.8% 
California 97.16% Solid 100.0% 6.5% 40.1% 15.9% 37.6% 
Delaware 96.83% Solid 100.0% 2.9% 49.9% 19.6% 27.6% 
Massachusetts 95.27% Solid 101.1% 1.3% 11.6% 6.6% 80.6% 
Iowa 95.18% Solid 91.3% 8.3% 18.2% 12.9% 60.5% 
Maine 95.03% Solid 103.0% 14.8% 19.3% 5.0% 60.9% 
Nevada 93.28% Adequate 96.9% 13.1% 38.7% 18.3% 29.9% 
Idaho 91.65% Adequate 111.7% 8.8% 40.5% 22.6% 28.1% 
Virginia 91.44% Adequate 86.5% 9.1% 29.4% 17.1% 44.4% 
Georgia 89.18% Adequate 100.0% 44.5% 46.6% 5.2% 3.7% 
Missouri 88.49% Adequate 100.0% 26.1% 20.6% 8.5% 44.8% 
Vermont 87.30% Adequate 97.0% 8.3% 36.4% 28.3% 27.0% 
Mississippi 86.19% Adequate 98.4% 15.2% 42.6% 26.2% 16.0% 
Arizona 83.97% Adequate 100.0% 15.2% 58.3% 13.0% 13.4% 
Texas 81.10% Adequate 95.1% 27.7% 39.6% 15.5% 17.3% 
Arkansas 80.81% Adequate 100.0% 10.6% 51.7% 14.7% 23.0% 
Rhode Island 80.69% Adequate 100.0% 13.3% 16.3% 6.1% 64.3% 
Minnesota 79.34% Inadequate 91.2% 0.6% 17.7% 8.3% 73.3% 
South Carolina 78.37% Inadequate 100.0% 23.7% 17.3% 29.9% 29.0% 
New Hampshire 75.01% Inadequate 96.9% 6.8% 43.2% 18.4% 31.7% 
New Jersey 73.47% Inadequate 39.1% 2.0% 36.0% 34.0% 28.0% 
Oklahoma 72.35% Inadequate 61.2% 18.0% 30.9% 19.6% 31.5% 
Kansas 71.25% Inadequate 70.8% 15.9% 32.0% 20.1% 31.9% 
Alabama 70.43% Inadequate 100.0% 5.1% 44.6% 32.9% 17.4% 
Kentucky 66.51% Inadequate 76.2% 9.6% 55.6% 21.8% 12.9% 
Louisiana 65.36% Inadequate 99.1% 11.7% 35.7% 14.9% 37.7% 
Illinois 48.38% Inadequate 76.9% 7.3% 16.9% 4.1% 71.8% 
Source: Author’s construction based on data provided by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College. 
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Appendix B. State Pension Plans and Individual Timeline Data – ARC Ratios 
State Pension 
System Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 AVG 
South Dakota Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Florida Solid 110% 97% 98% 92% 102% 96% 111% 107% 101.6% 
Pennsylvania Solid 147% 222% 123% 100% 46% 36% 39% 40% 94.2% 
Wisconsin Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.9% 
New Mexico Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Ohio Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Wyoming Solid 483% 111% 67% 67% 108% 111% 99% 100% 143.3% 
California Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Delaware Solid 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Massachusetts Solid 116% 124% 71% 71% 106% 96% 101% 125% 101.1% 
Iowa Solid 100% 100% 99% 91% 86% 84% 83% 87% 91.3% 
Maine Solid 100% 100% 104% 109% 105% 106% 100% 100% 103.0% 
Nevada Adequate 100% 96% 89% 100% 100% 97% 97% 96% 96.9% 
Idaho Adequate 130% 133% 110% 97% 100% 105% 110% 109% 111.7% 
Virginia Adequate 100% 80% 68% 92% 85% 90% 86% 93% 86.5% 
Georgia Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Missouri Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Vermont Adequate 99% 98% 99% 92% 101% 97% 98% 93% 97.0% 
Mississippi Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 90% 97% 98.4% 
Arizona Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Texas Adequate 118% 104% 97% 89% 86% 87% 89% 90% 95.1% 
Arkansas Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Rhode Island Adequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Minnesota Inadequate 131% 152% 96% 76% 81% 65% 71% 58% 91.2% 
South Carolina Inadequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
New Hampshire Inadequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 96.9% 
New Jersey Inadequate 13% 10% 38% 43% 40% 56% 60% 55% 39.1% 
Oklahoma Inadequate 77% 74% 59% 52% 53% 55% 58% 61% 61.2% 
Kansas Inadequate 78% 80% 79% 69% 69% 63% 64% 65% 70.8% 
Alabama Inadequate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 
Kentucky Inadequate 108% 125% 111% 55% 63% 51% 54% 43% 76.2% 
Louisiana Inadequate 101% 97% 95% 95% 99% 93% 97% 115% 99.1% 
Illinois Inadequate 124% 126% 88% 83% 59% 31% 44% 60% 76.9% 
Source: Author’s construction based on data provided by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the                                                  
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. 
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Appendix C. State Pension Plans and Individual Timeline Data – Investment Performance 
State Pension 
System Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 AVG* CUM* 
South Dakota Solid -2.9% -4.9% 5.0% 16.6% 13.3% 13.1% 21.4% -8.7% 6.62% 60.65% 
Florida Solid -7.6% -8.1% 2.9% 16.7% 10.2% 10.6% 18.1% -4.4% 4.78% 40.10% 
Pennsylvania Solid -7.9% -10.9% 24.3% 15.1% 14.5% 16.4% 17.2% -28.7% 5.00% 30.76% 
Wisconsin Solid -6.3% -5.8% 4.0% 17.2% 10.9% 12.3% 18.3% -5.1% 5.68% 50.28% 
New Mexico Solid -1.9% -2.1% 3.7% 15.6% 9.9% 11.7% 18.1% -7.4% 5.95% 54.59% 
Ohio Solid 0.0% -10.7% 25.3% 12.5% 9.0% 14.7% 8.5% -26.9% 4.63% 24.80% 
Wyoming Solid -4.4% -9.3% 21.0% 11.5% 8.2% 12.6% 7.4% -29.6% 2.18% 7.81% 
California Solid -7.2% -6.1% 3.7% 16.6% 12.3% 11.8% 19.1% -5.1% 5.64% 49.52% 
Delaware Solid -5.1% -6.3% 3.1% 15.9% 9.6% 12.4% 15.9% -1.3% 5.53% 49.74% 
Massachusetts Solid -6.6% -6.5% 4.0% 19.4% 13.4% 15.5% 20.0% -1.8% 7.17% 67.36% 
Iowa Solid -4.7% -4.9% 5.6% 13.8% 11.3% 11.1% 16.3% -1.3% 5.88% 54.32% 
Maine Solid -7.9% -7.5% 5.3% 16.6% 11.8% 7.5% 16.2% -3.1% 4.86% 41.55% 
Nevada Adequate -1.5% -2.7% 5.0% 12.1% 9.3% 8.8% 15.0% -3.2% 5.35% 49.34% 
Idaho Adequate -6.1% -7.1% 3.7% 18.1% 10.8% 12.2% 20.0% -4.2% 5.93% 52.72% 
Virginia Adequate -7.4% -7.3% 2.5% 17.9% 12.0% 12.4% 20.4% -4.4% 5.76% 50.31% 
Georgia Adequate -6.0% 4.0% 4.5% 9.8% 7.8% 6.2% 14.7% -3.5% 4.69% 42.14% 
Missouri Adequate -2.2% -6.2% 7.0% 17.1% 12.6% 11.5% 18.7% 1.6% 7.51% 74.04% 
Vermont Adequate -8.5% -7.4% 4.6% 15.7% 8.9% 10.6% 16.5% -5.9% 4.31% 35.39% 
Mississippi Adequate -7.1% -6.6% 3.5% 14.6% 9.8% 10.7% 18.9% -8.2% 4.45% 36.54% 
Arizona Adequate -6.7% -8.2% 2.4% 17.5% 8.5% 9.8% 17.8% -7.6% 4.19% 33.63% 
Texas Adequate -6.9% -7.2% 9.2% 11.7% 12.7% 8.8% 13.9% -4.6% 4.71% 40.48% 
Arkansas Adequate -3.8% -5.7% 5.5% 13.4% 9.9% 12.2% 18.0% -4.5% 5.63% 50.83% 
Rhode Island Adequate -11.0% -8.4% 3.9% 19.5% 12.2% 12.6% 15.8% -5.4% 4.91% 40.15% 
Minnesota Inadequate -7.1% -8.2% 2.4% 16.5% 10.7% 12.3% 18.3% -5.0% 4.99% 42.14% 
South Carolina Inadequate 7.5% 0.9% 9.0% 8.8% 7.0% 5.1% 13.4% -2.6% 6.14% 59.87% 
New Hampshire Inadequate -6.7% -6.4% 2.5% 14.9% 10.1% 10.0% 16.0% -4.6% 4.48% 37.84% 
New Jersey Inadequate -10.4% -9.0% 3.3% 14.1% 8.7% 9.8% 17.1% -2.7% 3.87% 30.74% 
Oklahoma Inadequate -5.9% -5.1% 5.7% 14.0% 10.5% 8.0% 16.4% -4.2% 4.93% 43.20% 
Kansas Inadequate -7.3% -4.7% 4.0% 15.4% 12.1% 12.3% 18.0% -4.4% 5.68% 50.57% 
Alabama Inadequate -6.4% -9.3% 16.5% 10.1% 11.0% 8.4% 17.9% -15.2% 4.12% 30.94% 
Kentucky Inadequate -5.4% -4.3% 4.3% 13.6% 9.3% 9.7% 15.3% -4.2% 4.78% 42.01% 
Louisiana Inadequate -5.8% -5.7% 4.2% 18.0% 10.2% 11.9% 19.2% -3.8% 6.03% 54.45% 
Illinois Inadequate -7.1% -6.9% 0.3% 16.4% 10.1% 11.0% 17.1% -6.2% 4.34% 35.55% 
Source: Author’s construction based on data provided by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College. 
 
